Essay Plan: "Constructive liability should have no place in the law of homicide. Discuss."

Essay Plan: "Constructive liability should have no place in the law of homicide. Discuss."

Introduction

• Focus: Introduce the concept of constructive liability in homicide, specifically unlawful act manslaughter.

• Thesis: This essay will argue that constructive liability in homicide creates a problematic gap between moral blame and legal responsibility, leading to outcomes that conflict with principles of fairness and justice.

Paragraph 1: The Gap Between Moral Blame and Death

• Focus: Discuss the significant gap between the defendant’s moral blameworthiness and the outcome (death) in constructive liability cases.

◦ One-Punch Killer Scenario: Even if the defendant did not foresee any harm, they can still be liable for manslaughter.

◦ Case Law:

▪ R v Mitchell (1982): Defendant pushed a person, leading to another’s death via transferred malice. Highlights the broad scope of liability under constructive manslaughter.

▪ Critique: The complete lack of foreseeability in such cases broadens the scope of liability too much, making the law excessively harsh.

▪ R v Watson (1989): Defendant’s awareness of the victim’s vulnerability (post-entry) sufficed for manslaughter, despite no direct foreseeability of harm when entering the house.

◦ Principle Conflict: This approach conflicts with the correspondence principle, where the actus reus and mens rea should correspond to the same crime.

▪ Miller Principle: The courts have stretched the principle in other contexts, but further stretching in constructive liability cases may erode fairness and justice.

Paragraph 2: Problems with Transferred Malice and Lack of Foreseeability

• Focus: Examine how transferred malice and lack of foreseeability contribute to the issues with constructive liability.

◦ Transferred Malice: Expands liability beyond the direct consequences of the defendant's actions.

▪ Case Analysis: Mitchell—demonstrates the harshness when liability is transferred without considering the defendant’s actual foresight.

◦ Lack of Foreseeability: The law overlooks the defendant's lack of foresight in constructive liability cases, leading to potentially unjust outcomes.

▪ Watson Principle: The test of a reasonable person with the defendant’s knowledge can lead to unfair conclusions, especially when the defendant’s knowledge is limited or gained after the fact.

• Focus: Discuss how constructive liability undermines fundamental legal principles, particularly the correspondence principle and the notion of proportionality.

◦ Correspondence Principle: The actus reus and mens rea should align for the same crime, ensuring that the defendant's liability reflects their moral blameworthiness.

◦ Proportionality: Constructive liability can lead to disproportionate outcomes, where the punishment does not fit the moral culpability of the defendant.

▪ Example: In Watson, the imposition of manslaughter liability based on the defendant’s later-acquired knowledge seems disproportionate to their initial conduct.

◦ Critique: Constructive liability may lead to over-criminalisation, where defendants are punished for outcomes that far exceed their moral responsibility.

Paragraph 4: Arguments for and Against Reform

• Focus: Consider potential reforms or alternatives to constructive liability in homicide cases.

◦ Arguments for Reform:

▪ Greater Alignment with Moral Culpability: Reform could ensure that liability is more closely tied to what the defendant actually foresaw or intended.

▪ Fairer Outcomes: Reducing reliance on constructive liability could lead to outcomes that better reflect the defendant's moral blameworthiness.

◦ Arguments Against Reform:

▪ Public Protection: Some argue that constructive liability serves as a necessary deterrent and public protection measure, holding people accountable for dangerous acts.

▪ Practical Challenges: Reforming the law may create practical challenges, such as proving foresight or intention in more complex cases.

◦ Conclusion on Reform: While there are arguments for maintaining constructive liability, the fairness and justice concerns suggest that reform is necessary to better align the law with moral culpability.

Conclusion

• Summary: Constructive liability in homicide cases often leads to outcomes that are not aligned with the defendant's moral blameworthiness, undermining key legal principles.

• Final Argument: Given the significant gap between moral blame and legal liability, and the conflicts with principles like correspondence and proportionality, constructive liability should indeed have no place in the law of homicide.

Sample Paragraph:

Unlawful act manslaughter can be argued to have ‘no place’ in the law of homicide because the gap it creates between moral blame and death is too great. This is because crimes such as the ‘one punch killer’ can amount to manslaughter. This means that even if the defendant didn’t even foresee any harm, they can still be convicted for manslaughter. This is problematic because of the large scope of foreseeability from crimes of highly culpability to the very low ‘one punch killer’ level of culpability. For example, in the Mitchell 1982 case, the defendant pushed an individual who fell onto the victim who hit his head and died. The defendant was charged with constructive manslaughter through the doctrine of transferred. Not only does this case depict the harshness of the court allowing the ‘one punch killer’ as manslaughter but it is further expanded through transferred malice. The lack of foreseeability should also play a significant factor but this is largely overlooked which does highlight the problems with constructive liability. Furthermore, the case of Watson 1989, where the defendant broke into the victim’s house, verbally abused the victim and left, was charged with constructive manslaughter because the victim died ninety minutes after this incident. Although the appeal was allowed, it was on different grounds. This case established the Watson case which held that the test is of a reasonable person with the defendant’s knowledge of the circumstances. Although the defendant didn’t have knowledge of the victim’s condition when he entered, he became aware of the vulnerability and therefore this would amount to sufficient knowledge to convict him. This clearly conflicts with the correspondence principle which states that the actus reus and mens rea must be of the same crime. Although the courts have stretched this principle for the Miller 1982 rule, we should challenge stretching this rule any further as it erodes fairness and justice.