Essay Plan: ‘Murder is Only Committed by People Who Kill with the Intention that Their Victims Should Die, and the Law Should be Reformed to Reflect That.’

Essay Plan: ‘Murder is Only Committed by People Who Kill with the Intention that Their Victims Should Die, and the Law Should be Reformed to Reflect That.’

Introduction

• Focus: Discusses whether the law of murder should be reformed to reflect that it is only committed by individuals who kill with the intention that their victims should die.

• Thesis: The current law of murder encompasses a broader range of culpability than mere intention to kill, and while a reform to narrow this scope might be desirable for clarity and fairness, it must be approached carefully to avoid unintended consequences.

Paragraph 1: The Fault Element of Murder is Too Wide

• Overview:

◦ Current Fault Element: The fault element of murder currently includes not just direct intention but also indirect intention and, arguably, the infliction of grievous bodily harm (GBH) with intent.

◦ Cases and Expansion:

▪ R v Vickers (1957): Established that intent to cause GBH can be sufficient for murder.

▪ R v Cunningham (1957): Further confirmed that recklessness can contribute to the fault element.

▪ R v Bollom (2004): Expanded the definition of GBH, thus broadening the scope of what constitutes murder.

◦ Critique:

▪ Parliamentary Intent: The broad scope of the fault element might not align with the intention of Parliament for murder and sentencing, which could have been aimed at more serious cases.

▪ French Law: Contrast with French legal principles that may offer more precise definitions.

▪ Fair Labelling: Need for clearer criteria to ensure appropriate labelling of culpability.

◦ Proposal: Rather than moving GBH to manslaughter, which is already broad, there should be a clearer outline of what constitutes GBH.

Paragraph 2: Uncertain Definition of Intention to Murder

• Overview:

◦ Direct and Indirect Intention: The law encompasses both direct intention and indirect (or oblique) intention.

◦ Case Law Evolution:

▪ DPP v Smith (1961) and Hyam v DPP (1975): Established that foresight of death or serious injury can imply intent.

▪ S.8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967: Provided a statutory framework for interpreting intention.

▪ R v Moloney (1985), Hancock & Shankland (1986), and Woolin (1998): Developed the test for indirect intention, culminating in the ‘virtual certainty’ test.

▪ R v Matthews & Alleyne (2003): Further refined the test.

◦ Critique:

▪ Piecemeal Solutions: The evolution of indirect intention through various cases reflects a piecemeal approach that lacks consistency.

▪ Theoretical Perspectives: Scholars like Alan Norrie and Antony Duff argue that the practical indifference to death, rather than intention to kill, can sometimes be treated as equivalent to intent in law.

▪ Scope of Application: Uncertainty remains about whether these principles apply uniformly across all cases of murder.

Paragraph 3: Coincidence, Correspondence, and Transferred Malice

• Overview: Principles:

▪ Coincidence: The requirement that the actus reus and mens rea must coincide (e.g., R v Thabo Meli (1954)).

▪ Correspondence: Ensures that the defendant’s intention matches the criminal act (e.g., R v Miller (1983)).

▪ Transferred Malice: Intention to harm one person can be transferred to another (e.g., R v Latimer (1886) and AG’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994)).

◦ Critique:

▪ Fine Line Between Murder and Manslaughter: The application of these doctrines can blur the line between murder and manslaughter.

▪ Constructive Manslaughter: May conflict with the principle of correspondence and complicate the categorisation of culpability.

Paragraph 4: Law Commission Proposal

• Overview:

◦ Current Proposals: The Law Commission has explored reforming murder to simplify and clarify the law, potentially narrowing it to cases with clear intention to kill.

◦ Challenges:

▪ Complex Cases: Reforms must address complex cases where intent might be ambiguous.

▪ Victor Tadros: Concerns about creating indifference to death, as the legal standard might affect moral judgments and the perception of culpability.

▪ Aggravated Offences: Consideration of introducing aggravated offences could provide a middle ground, distinguishing between varying levels of culpability within the scope of non-fatal offences.

Conclusion

• Summary: Reforming murder to limit it to cases with a clear intention to kill could address the current broad scope but must be carefully crafted to avoid undermining legal principles and fair labelling.

• Recommendation: Rather than broad reform, a more nuanced approach that clarifies the definitions of GBH and intention, and carefully addresses the complexities of current doctrines, might be preferable.