Essay Plan: ‘Where there are multiple factual causes of a criminal outcome it is unclear which, if any, of them will be held to be the legal cause.’

Essay Plan: ‘Where there are multiple factual causes of a criminal outcome it is unclear which, if any, of them will be held to be the legal cause.’

Introduction

• Focus: The essay examines the complexities of establishing legal causation where multiple factual causes exist and how this affects criminal liability.

• Thesis: The law on causation is intricate and context-specific, with multiple principles contributing to its complexity. This essay will argue that the current legal framework, though detailed, often leads to confusion due to its reliance on multiple principles and exceptions.

Paragraph 1: Intervening Factors and Novus Actus Interveniens

• Overview:

◦ Factual vs. Legal Causation: Factual causation is broad (but-for test), while legal causation requires that the cause be substantial and operating.

◦ Novus Actus Interveniens: Intervening acts that break the chain of causation.

• Case Analysis:

◦ Empress Car Company v National Rivers Authority (1998): Defendants’ actions were deemed not to break the chain of causation as they were not ‘extraordinary’ or ‘abnormal.’ The court applied an extra principle requiring that intervening acts be out of the ordinary.

◦ R v Kennedy (2007): The court ruled that a free, voluntary, and informed act by a third party (victim self-injecting heroin) breaks the chain of causation. This decision shifted the focus from 'extraordinary and abnormal' to an emphasis on the autonomy of the victim.

◦ S.23 OAPA: Discuss its implications and whether it complicates the concept further by introducing additional elements.

Critique:

• Complexity: The introduction of varying principles, like ‘extraordinary and abnormal’ versus ‘voluntary and informed,’ creates a lack of clarity in determining legal causation.

• Consistency: These differing standards lead to inconsistent applications of the law, making it difficult to ascertain which factual causes will be deemed legally significant.

Paragraph 2: Reasonable Foreseeability

• Overview:

◦ Reasonable Foreseeability: How foreseeability of the result affects legal causation.

• Case Analysis:

◦ R v Roberts (1971): The court found the defendant liable because the victim’s reaction (jumping out of a car) was not deemed too ‘daft’ to be foreseeable.

◦ R v Blaue (1975): The thin skull rule applied, holding that the defendant was responsible despite the victim’s refusal of a blood transfusion due to religious beliefs.

◦ Cherkassy: Introduced further principles which complicate the foreseeability test.

Critique:

• Foreseeability as an Additional Principle: While foreseeability is essential, relying on it alongside other principles (like substantial and operating cause) can confuse the legal assessment.

• Impact on Legal Causation: Foreseeability often overshadows the substantive legal causation tests, leading to unclear boundaries for liability.

Paragraph 3: Intervening Voluntary Euthanasia

• Overview:

◦ Intervening Voluntary Euthanasia: New requirements for establishing legal causation in the context of voluntary euthanasia.

• Case Analysis:

◦ R v Wallace (2018): The court introduced the ‘unfettered volition’ requirement, assessing whether the victim’s decision to seek euthanasia was independent of the defendant’s actions.

◦ Comparison with Kennedy: Evaluates whether the decision in Wallace overrules or complicates the Kennedy precedent, which emphasised voluntary and informed actions.

◦ Impact on Legal Causation: Shift to ‘operating and significant’ cause as opposed to being the main cause.

Critique:

• Confusion and Complexity: Introducing additional requirements like ‘unfettered volition’ complicates the determination of legal causation, creating further uncertainty.

• Legal Principles: Changes to the legal causation test, especially with regard to euthanasia, can lead to inconsistencies in applying the law.

Paragraph 4: The Need for Reform and New Approaches

• Overview:

◦ Hart and Honoré’s Critique: Propose reevaluating the distinctions between normal and abnormal conditions, which they argue are vague and circular.

• Current State:

◦ Existing Confusion: The blend of multiple principles like substantial and operating causes, foreseeability, and novus actus interveniens leads to a convoluted legal framework.

• Recommendations:

◦ Reform Proposals: Potential for a more streamlined approach to causation that reduces reliance on multiple principles.

◦ Hart and Honoré’s Suggestions: Reassessing and simplifying the causation framework to improve clarity.

Critique:

• Need for Clarity: Addressing the convoluted nature of legal causation and ensuring that any reform genuinely simplifies and clarifies the rules rather than adding additional layers of complexity.

Conclusion

• Summary: The law of causation, particularly with multiple factual causes, is complex and influenced by various principles and exceptions. This complexity often leads to inconsistent outcomes and confusion.

• Recommendation: Consider reforms to streamline the causation framework, ensuring that it is clear and consistent while addressing the current ambiguities in legal causation.

Sample Paragraphs

The application of reasonable foreseeability as a mode of finding factual causation further erodes legal causation. In R v Roberts 1971, the driver (defendant) tried to remove their passenger’s (victim) coat which resulted in her jumping out of the car and suffering actual bodily harm. The court held that the defendant is liable because the chain of causation for finding factual causation is only broken if the victim’s reaction is ‘so daft’ that it would not be foreseeable. Considering the context, the court held that jumping out of a car is reasonably foreseeable. Legal causation had a minimal impact in this decision because the fact as to whether there was a ‘substantial’ and ‘operating’ cause depended on its reasonable foreseeability. Another case called R v Blaue 1975 further side-lined legal causation. This involved the defendant who stabbed the victim. After being taken to hospital, the victim refused a blood transfusion for religious reasons and subsequently died. The court held that the defendant was liable and the chain had not broken because of the thin skull rule. The defendant must take their victims as they find them. The role of legal causation plays a secondary role through the thin skull rule.

The approach to finding factual causation for intervening voluntary euthanasia has further confused the law in finding a legal cause. The case of R v Wallace 2018 is a recent example that has contributed significantly to the relationship between factual and legal causes. The case involved the defendant who had poured acid on the victims face rendering her in a permanent state of pain. After the victim applied for voluntary euthanasia under Belgian law (because it is illegal in the UK), the defendant was charged with murder. The defendant’s lawyers held there was no case to answer because there was no legal causation. This case is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it added the ‘unfettered’ requirement to factual causation. This states that the death was not independent of the defendant’s act because the euthanasia was not committed with ‘free and unfettered volition’. How does this stand in relation to Kennedy’s ‘voluntary, informed and free requirement’?. This has certainly widened the scope of the Kennedy precedent because if there was a similar case to Kennedy in the future, one could argue that the victim in Kennedy wasn’t unfettered. The victims love of drugs may have pressurised the individual to take them. Secondly, it had shifted the scope of legal causation. They stated that one only has to prove that there was an ‘operating and significant’ cause of death. This suggests that the defendant doesn’t have to be the main cause of death, a secondary factor will suffice.